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Abstract
Traditionally, only technical inventions such as light
bulbs or pharmaceuticals were protected by patents.
Nowadays software patents are a widely discussed topic
in the U.S. and in Europe because of their proposed impact on national innovation rates. Based on an analysis of
the determinants of successfully developing software, we
use a bipartite probability model to compare a deregulated market without patents to a market using a patent
system. Applying computer-based simulations, we analyze different scenarios to test the impact of different patent duration and width on the innovation behavior of the
software market. We can show that strong patent protection is globally efficient only in markets with a relatively
low profit potential.

legal patent issues (section 2.2) is given. Based on this,
an economic simulation model incorporating individual
patent incentives and their implications on (aggregate)
system behavior is recapitulated from an earlier paper
(section 3). Section 4 presents the simulation results as
well as the arising conclusions. Section 5 gives a short
summarization of the paper and proposes future research.

2.

Literature Review

2.1 Special Issues of the Software Market
Market topology: The market for software products is
embedded into the IT market, which is part of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) market
shown in Figure 1.

1. Introduction
Traditionally, patent protection was awarded only to
technical inventions, such as light bulbs, shavers, or
pharmaceuticals. After computer programming became
viable, and protection of computer programs became desirable most countries decided that software was too abstract or intangible to be patentable, and copyright became
the dominant form of protection. In the last years firms
were going to demand patents on software-related inventions, which drove an intense public and academic discussion regarding the use of patent systems to protect software.
Software consists of functional as well as expressive
attributes. Functional attributes describe special instructions and expressive attributes their representation [7].
This hybrid structure made it difficult for patent officials
to assess the technical character of inventions, which is a
prerequisite for patenting inventions. Another problem is
the lack of qualified patent inspectors and the associated
difficulty to assess the novelty. This has resulted in quite
a number of patents being granted for inventions considered to be obvious by experts in the field.
The goal of this paper is to answer these questions:
1. How do scenarios with and without patent system
differ in terms of the endemic propensity to monopolize?
2. In which scenario can we expect a higher level of
innovation?
After an overview of specific characteristics of the
software market (section 2.1) a survey of economic and
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Figure 1: Complexity and different submarkets
of the ICT market
Beside a high momentum in technical innovations and
strong competitiveness in the ICT market, leading to constantly shorter product cycles and even higher pressure
towards innovativeness, one can also identify paradigm
shifts that lead to fundamental changes of business rules
in general [5]. The wide application of ICT has lead to a
rapid decline in prices and costs in the computing and telecommunications sector with positive repercussions for a
variety of other products, like aircrafts, automobiles and
scientific instruments. Table 1 shows the forecasted revenues in different regional software markets [12].
Cost structure: It is relatively costly to produce the
first copy of a software product while the costs of additional copies are very low (e.g. CD-ROM) or even negligible (e.g. if distributed via download from the Internet).
From an economic perspective this means high fixed
costs and very low marginal costs leading to substantial

namic pricing (and in particular penetration pricing) is
economies of scale [29]. Compared to the chemical marone of the most important strategies in modern software
ket with fixed costs for developing one product amountmarkets.
ing to € 300 million [6], the fixed costs are low. Since
software is immaterial, the distribution costs also are
Positive network effects: It is common in many marsignificantly lower than for physical goods.
kets that a consumer’s buying decision influences the
others´ decisions. Interdependencies such as the bandInstant scalability: Closely related to the cost structure
wagon, snob, and Veblen effect are broadly discussed in
is the phenomenon of instant scalability in software marthe economic literature (e.g. [8]). Beside these general efkets. Since it is very easy to reproduce and distribute cofects, which apply to all consumer decisions, software
pies of software, suppliers can respond very quickly to an
markets are determined by positive network effects, the
increase in demand. Therefore, once a software product is
so-called demand-sided economies of scale, deriving
recognized as superior, the particular vendor might be
from the need for product compatibility. This means that
able to gain a significant market share in a short period of
the willingness to adopt a product innovation correlates
time [25].
positively with the number of existing adopters. These efPricing: Cost structure and instant scalability influenfects mainly originate from two different areas, the need
ce pricing strategies in software markets. Of course it
for compatible products to exchange data or information
does not make sense to apply marginal-cost-based pricing
(direct network effects) and the need for complementary
if the costs of reproduction are close to zero. Pricing is
products and services (indirect network effects) [11] [14]
more likely to be determined by consumer value, leading
[23].
to differential pricing [29]. Because of the importance of
the installed base due to positive network effects, dyTable 1: Total Revenue of the ICT market (Million €) [12]
Western
Eastern
USA
Japan
Rest of World
World
2003
Europe
Europe
211,544
12,236
208,721
119,759
216,815
769,077
ICT equipment
Software
IT services
Carrier services
Total

81,856
158,773
278,381
730,554

1,845
2,876
19,244
36,201

135,606
262,536
293,541
900,404

Tippiness: Supply-sided economies of scale, instant
scalability, and positive network effects can result in a
specific dynamic structural change in software markets
referred to as tippiness. If the diffusion of a certain software product gains sufficient momentum the market
might tip meaning that a particular product takes over the
entire market in a short time. The phenomenon is analyzed analytically in [2] and empirically in [25].
Start-up problem and critical mass: Due to the existence of network effects, early technology adopters
bear the risk of buying a product which might not succeed in gaining the expected market share. This can lead
to excess inertia even if the product is seen as superior
[2]. Related to the start-up problem is the critical mass,
being the threshold number of users needed to overcome
the start-up problem. Reaching this point in the diffusion
process might then again result in rapid acceleration and
in tipping of the market.
Propensity to monopolize: Network effect literature
states that multiple, incompatible technologies can only
rarely coexist in markets with network effects, and that
instant scalability results in an additional tendency to
monopolize. Empirical observations show monopolistic
structures in some of the modern software markets like
the market for office suites, word processors, or spreadsheets [25].
Utilization and availability of open code: Open code
is one of the most important external factors for software
development (up to 20%) [15]. The strongest usage ema-

22,813
73,276
111,801
327,649

45,070
85,203
338,207
685,295

287,189
582,664
1,041,173
2,0680,103

nates from independent developers, but recently the reuse of open source software by medium-size and large
companies has increased as well [15]. Open source has a
generic character, i.e. in many cases it is functional input
which makes software development more effective. There
is no significant argument for utilizing open source, but a
relatively well balanced set of motives (e.g. adaptability,
state-of-the-art, costs and quality). Disclosure of code is
used mostly as strategy to diffuse information about one’s
own performance.

2.2 Special Issues of Patents
2.2.1

Legal Perspective

Until the US Supreme Court’s decision Diamond vs.
Diehr in 1981, patent protection for software was almost
non-existent. In this instance, the Court ruled that a computerized process for curing rubber was patentable even
though the process involved an algorithm which by itself
was not patentable [27]. The distinction was that the algorithm was applied to a process, as opposed to attempting
to patent the algorithm [27]. Computer programs are patentable in the USA today. It is even possible to patent
business methods. Basically, the requirements for patentable items (inventions) are ruled in part II, chapter 10
of the U.S: Patent Act [31]: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject

to the conditions and requirements of this title” [31, §
101]. The criteria for granting a patent are:
The person is the inventor [31, § 102], the invention is
the proper subject matter for a patent: machines, articles
of manufacture, compositions of matter, and processes
[31, § 101], and the invention is "useful", "new", [31, §
102] and "unobvious" [31, § 103].
For most types of inventions, the first two requirements usually present little difficulty. Generally speaking,
an invention is useful if the invention has an utilitarian or
commercial value; an invention is new if it is the first
embodiment of the idea in a useful thing or process; and
an invention is unobvious if it would not have been obvious to a person reasonably skilled in the pertinent art, given what already existed in the particular field. This last
requirement often is the most difficult barrier for patenting a new invention since often it is very subjective to
determine whether the differences between the new invention and the prior state of the art are obvious solutions
to known problems. The four mentioned categories (process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
have - together with the requirements of utility and novelty - the function to restrict the set of patentable inventions; explicit prohibitions do not exist. The process for obtaining a patent on an invention typically starts with a patent attorney preparing and filing a patent application for
the inventor and owner of the invention with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The first
inventor is entitled to the patent over any subsequent inventors - even if the subsequent inventor applies first – as
long as the first inventor can prove the earlier date of the
invention.

Class
700
701
702
703
704
706
707
716
717

Table 2: Patents granted by class
in the years 1997-2001 [32]
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
349 660 536 465 660
329 510 684 824 1253
350 517 512 517 574
224 297 301 285 275
365 611 627 534 610
202 305 128 130 157
580 1189 1283 1131 1256
191 269 246 236 404
128 306 406 370 467

Amount
2670
3600
2470
1382
2747
922
5439
1346
1677
Total:
Amount 2369 4004 4187 4027 4996
22253
The application must be filed not later than one year
after: public use of the invention, the placing on the market of the invention for sale in the U.S., or the publication
of a description of the invention anywhere in the world.
Table 2 clarifies granted patents in the field of „Data Processing“1 in the U.S. between 1997-2001 [32]. A detailed
1

Class 700: Generic Control Systems or Specific Applications, Class
701: Vehicles, Navigation, and Relative Location, Class 702:
Measuring, Calibrating, or Testing, Class 703: Structural Design,
Modeling, Simulation, and Emulation, Class 704: Speech Signal
Processing, Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio Com-

overview of positive and negative patenting decisions involving software is given in [27].
2.2.2 Economic Perspective
Patents and the incentive problem: The standard economic rationale for patents is to protect potential innovators from others´ imitation, thereby providing incentives
to incur the cost of innovation. The innovator receives a
temporary monopolistic position [3]. The usage of the
patent system therefore has two essential advantages:
- The patent owner (monopolist) is able to claim
higher prices and larger market shares.
- The time frame for skimming the market will be artificially extended.
The patent owner has the possibility to offer licenses
and the chance to participate in the development or improvement of future innovations by licensees [28]. Since
the patenting process is expensive (one application in
Europe can cost up to € 50.000 [1]), small and mediumsize enterprises (SMEs) in particular are discriminated.
As a consequence, scarce financial resources constitute
substantial barriers to patenting among SMEs. Hence,
nondisclosure can be an optimal strategy [15].
Jaffe suggests that patents inhibit other innovation activities, for example by preventing access to licenses needed for improvements. This is characterized as negative
after deductions effect [22]. Furthermore Kortum & Lerner point out that despite decreasing R&D expenditure,
the number of patents in the U.S. is increasing quickly.
They substantiate these correlations with company-wide
advanced innovation management [24]. The same perception is represented by Bessen & Maskin. Moreover they
discuss about trivial patents which conduct knowledge
that is considered common knowledge and therefore not
patentable [4].
Patent race and cross licensing: Because each innovation can only be assigned once, innovators often find
themselves in a patent race. Although the losers face
R&D and patent application costs, they attain no revenue.
In this context Dasgupta & Stieglitz speak of a socially
unwanted situation [10]. At the same time, the licensing
process offers a possibility for reducing future innovation
costs of other innovators [26] [28]. The winner normally
is not engaged in offering licenses. Licensing implies
competition and endangers the patent owner’s monopoly
position. This leads to the inhibition of R&D by other inventors with concepts for improvements on a patented
product [4].
If, for example, another actor has invested in developing an improvement to a product, the firm holding the
original patent may use its monopoly position to appropriate some of the value created by the complementary innovation. This can occur even if a second firm obpression/Decompression, Class 706: Artificial Intelligence, Class
707: Database and File Management, Data Structures, Or Document Processing, Class 716: Design and Analysis of Circuit or
Semiconductor Mask, Class 717: Software Development, Installation, and Management.

tains a patent on the improvement. If the second firm can
signed in such situations, it still happens. Nowadays pamarket its innovation with the consent of the first firm,
tents offer the function of currencies. If a company needs
the first firm can increase its profits on the second´s acanother firm´s license for its own activities, it tries to excount by bargaining to license the complementary technochange its own license with that of the other license hollogy at less than full value. This holdup problem reduces
der. This operation is referred to as cross licensing. PatR&D in complementary technologies through inventors
ents are used as weapon in competition and play a decireducing the expected return on their investment [9].
sive role second to negotiations [20].
Although it appears as though licenses will never be asTable 3: Positive and negative aspects of patents
Positive aspects
Negative aspects
Microeconomic perspective
Imitators are discouraged through the consequences of
Substantial costs:
infringement.
Costs of patent description and of patent agents,
Patents also hamper piracy.
patent application and the costs of assignation of patAn extended time frame for skimming the market is given.
ents, costs of the extension of a patent.
Patents enforce the first mover advantage and therefore the Patent infringement is difficult to control, especially in
de-facto-standardization (positive feedback loops).
embedded systems. Moreover discovery of infringement is very expensive.
Patents represent assets strengthening the relative competi- The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens the ideas
tive position.
for others and gives them the chance to market the
ideas earlier.
The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens the ideas of oth- Development costs increase, because of licenses or
ers for own developments.
bypass of patented developments.
Improvements are only possible on a complementary
way (low rate of code re-using).
Risk of market exclusion.
Expending of development costs through the chance of bePatents can hamper interoperability.
ing monopolist and claiming higher prices.
Licensing and cross licensing are possible.
Macroeconomic perspective
Patents are an important incentive for spending capital in
Decrease of development efforts (holdup problem),
R&D.
cannibalizing the own network.
Decrease of product variety.
Inhibition of technical progress through the denial of
licenses.
Patents, sequentiality, and complementarity: Sequentiality describes each successive invention being built on
the preceding one. The rate of re-using code is very high
[4] [3]. Complementarity means that each potential innovator takes a somewhat different research line, thereby
enhancing the overall probability that a particular innovation goal will be reached within a given time [4]. The sequential and complementary nature of innovations is
widely recognized, especially in high tech industries [17]
[18] [9]. Analyses of many innovations found that most
of the productivity gains are achieved via improvements
to the original innovation (e.g. [13]). Empirical evidence
for innovative complementarities is provided by [30]
[19].
Table 3 summarizes positive and negative aspects of
patenting software. We distinguished between the view of
an individual actor (microeconomic perspective) and the
macroeconomic perspective.

3. The Model
In the following our model for investigating the economic impact of patents will be introduced. The main difference to existing work in this research field is the approach of a simulation model to augment the small analytical models, proposed by Bessen/Maskin 2000,
Green/Scotchmer 1995, Chang 1995 etc. about the impact
of additional key factors like different levels of complementarity, cost structures, and multiple periods. The increased complexity, triggered by these parameters circumvents the applicability of analytical methods.
The following assumptions are based on the preceding
literature review:
1. The software market is characterized by short innovation cycles. Improvements emerge frequently in a cycle
of less than 12 months.
2. The software market is characterized by a high rate of
incremental progress. Innovations in this market are
profoundly sequential.
3. The market is characterized by a high degree of complementarity.

4. Research and development efforts in one generation
become obsolete after a few (3) periods.
5. R&D-efforts have an extensive impact on finding future innovations (3 periods).
Based on these assumptions, we developed a bipartite
economic multi-period model comparing a deregulated
market without patents to a market using the patent system. The basic model was developed in [21] so only the
main elements are presented here. In this paper we focus
on simulation results regarding the impact of the length
and scope of a patenting system on the firms´ innovation
behavior. The model encompasses I actors, representing
software manufacturers in a particular segment of the
software market (e.g. text processing). The model considers three different company sizes. Based on the topological data of the German software market the actors are
organized into sectors of small (80%), medium-size
(15%) and large companies (5%) [16]. In each period t
one or several parallel innovations lead to the economic
profit vt which is assumed to be constant over time and
will be split between the successful actors (analogous to
[4]). Therefore, the actors compete with each other for the
same innovation in one period. The planning horizon of
the model is T.
Another parameter influencing the expected profit are
the development costs citd. The greater the efforts the
smaller the profits, but the higher the probability of success. The amount of citd depends on the company’s size.
The larger the company the higher the possible development costs. If patenting is possible the companies taking
part in the patenting process further have to spend patent
process costs citp.
Based on the assumptions presented above the core of
the model is formed by the innovation probability pit
which determines the innovation success of actor i finding the innovation in period t. pit is functionally dependent of the following factors:
- A: The development costs, spent in t and in the former 3 periods (assumption 5).
- B: The innovation success in the preceding 3 periods,
represented by the binary variables xit-1, xit-2; xit-3. xit
is equal to one, if actor i found the innovation in
period t (assumption 2).
- C: The patenting activities of the other innovators,
represented by εit = {0;1}. If patenting without licensing is possible, incremental improvements of
others in earlier periods (TP represents the current
time of patent protection, which actual amounts 20
years) have to be found in a complementary way,
diminishing the chance of success. This effect decreases the probability, if the innovation in period t
was patented by an actor j≠i. The nearer εit is to 1.0
the lower is the difficulty for finding a complementary way (assumption 3) and therefore the
smaller is the scope of patent protection.
- Various weighting (α, β, M) and discount factors (wd,
wx) (assumption 4) assess the influence of the several parameters, as can be seen in equation 1.

The aggregates A and B are normalized by dividing
them to the regarding maximum values. The derivation of
equation 1 can be found in [21].
A
B
α +β
B
A
⋅C =
p it =
M
t

α⋅

t −1
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τ
=t −3
t

∑c

τ =t −3

d
i

t −τ )
d

d
iτ

(t −τ )

+β⋅
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τ

t −τ )
x

i
=t −3
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∑w

τ =t −3
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(t −τ )
x

⋅

M

t −1

ε ττ
∏
τ

( − t +TP +1)
i

= t −T P

with α , β ≥ 0; α + β = 1 and M ≥ 1
The innovation and patenting process consists of four
activity steps in each period:
I. Actor i has to decide whether or not to participate in
the innovation process, i.e. spending development
costs citd.
II. His research process turns out to be either successful
or not, according to his innovation success probability pit.
III. If research is successful, the actor has to decide about
taking part in the patent race.
IV. Only one actor can win the patent race. The winner is
determined randomly with the same probability for
every actor participating in the patent race.
Steps III and IV only occur in the scenario which possesses a legal patent protection system. A risk-neutral actor i will only invest in R&D in period t if his expected
net benefit Exp[νit] is positive. The expectation depends
on the individual innovation probability, on the elevation
of effort, and on the network size. The bigger the network, the more actors will find the innovation resulting in
a reduced part of the economic profit.

[ ]

Exp ν itnet =

νt
I
Exp  ∑ xit 
i =1 

⋅ p it − citd



(2)
I

∑x


As an estimator for Exp


i =1

it

 , the number of ac


tors who found the innovation in the period before will be
used. The expected value does not include resulting future benefits, because technological progress is difficult to
predict and the complexity of the model would increase
superproportionally. If the actors can take advantage of
an installed patent protection mechanism, the model
comprises an additional decision function (3) for evaluating the benefits of patenting, including the probability to
win the patenting race. An innovator agrees to the patenting process if the expected actual economic profit minus
the patent application costs cp and plus the expected future benefits Exp BWt PZ of establishing a temporary mo-

[

]

nopoly is positive. The detailed derivation again can be
found in [21].
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Results

4.1 Parameterization
The following results are based on simulations, which
emulate the behavior of 100 software developers in a particular market segment. The actors are grouped into three
sectors of company-size (small = 80%, medium = 15%,
large = 5%), resulting in different exemplary chosen
ranges of development costs. The concrete values are
equally distributed within the ranges given in table 4. Every simulation was run about 50 periods (T = 50). The
total economic profit per period amounts to vt = 100 resp.
vt=1500 monetary units.

Herfindahl index is applied. This index is commonly used
to measure market concentration in industrial economics.
The index is calculated by summing up the squared market shares of each innovator. In order to measure the stability of temporal monopolies we constructed an intertemporal Herfindahl index HKI which represents the
distribution of the different patents (over time) in the
network. HKI = 1.0 means every patent within the simulated periods was hold by the same actor, while lower values represent changing patent owners over time.
Figure 2 shows the resulting values for vt = 100 and vt
= 1500. The higher the patent scope and/or patent length,
the higher the tendency of intertemporal monopolization,
i.e. at low ε and high Tp rather only one actor will gain all
innovations and patents over time. The trend of monopolization is much more distinctive in the low potential market (vt=100).

Table 4: Distribution of development costs
Company sector Large
Medium
Small
d
c ti upper bound
60
40
30
c dti lower bound

30

20

10

We used the parameterization of the weighting and
discount factors in equation 1 as shown in table 5. These
values are based on no empirical evidence yet and are only chosen as a starting point for later sensitivity analyses.
Using these values the different influence factors are
weighted equally within the innovation probability.
Table 5: Constant probability parameters
Further parameters determining the innovation
probability
Weight of prior development costs

wd

0.9

Weight of prior successful innovations

wx

0.9

Relative weight of development costs

α

0.5

Relative weight of successful innovations

β

0.5

Market difficulty

M

1.0

4.2 Simulation Results
The following simulation results are shown for two
different environments (vt = 100 or vt =1500 in every period) to analyze markets with low and high profit potential. Both environments are simulated without (scenario I)
and with (scenario II) the availability of a legal patent
system. To analyze the impact of different system configurations in all cases the patent length Tp is varied from
1 to 20 periods (20 years is the actual current protection
time), and the patent protection scope ε is varied from 1.0
(= no protection) to 0.9 (values lower than 0.9 would result in such a high patent scope, that no innovation activities, except by the first patent owner, were possible).
The first question of our paper focuses on the endemic
propensity to monopolize. To examine this question the

Figure 2: Market concentration index for vt = 100
(upper diagram) and vt = 1500 (lower diagram)
The second research question focuses on the relation
between patentability and overall innovation rates. In order to answer this question, we measured the number of
periods in which at least one actor found the innovation.
We again compared the different market potentials (vt =
100 and 1500) and did four views at two different scopes
of patent protection (wide protection (ε = 0.9) and small
protection (ε = 0.99)) and two different current times of
protection (Tp=5 and Tp=20) while varying the other parameter (abscissa). Figure 3 and 4 show the results of the
different constellations for a small market value (vt=100).

The upper diagram in figure 3 shows that by varying
patent duration (Tp=1 up to Tp=20) with a constant small
protection width (ε = 0.99) the scenario with patent protection performs better with a patent current time between
6-15 periods. Below 5 periods both scenarios have on average 25 periods with innovations found. (Caused to the
low possible profit the decision function (eq. 2) leads to
oscillations in decision and innovation behavior.)

Figure 3: Number of innovations found with vt = 100
(varying patent length Tp at two different levels of ε)

Figure 4: Number of innovations found with vt = 100
(varying patent scope ε at different levels of Tp)

Figure 5 and 6 represent the corresponding results for
the same parameter constellations in a high value market
(vt=1500).

Figure 5: Number of innovations found with vt =
1500 (varying patent length Tp at two different levels
of ε)

Figure 6: Number of innovations found with vt = 100
(varying patent scope ε at two different
levels of Tp)

In this situation the results have changed. The overall
level of “innovative periods” is higher because the larger
market potential provokes more actors to invest in R&D.
The scenario without patent protection dominates in all
cases. The innovations found on average always are
higher. The longer the run time the bigger the difference
in favor of the scenario without patents. With constant
patent lengths (Tp=5 and Tp=20) the same results occur. It
is noteworthy that at Tp=20 the patent protection system
performs very badly between the patent scopes of ε =0.98
and ε =0.9. In this area only 20 innovations on average
could be found. In markets with a high innovations value,
the no-patent scenario dominates the patent scenario in
every case. This is more with long patent current times
and less with short run times. Comparing these results it
can be summarized that within a low market potential
combinations of rather high patent scope and rather short
patent duration (3-5 periods) a legal patent system provides worse results (see figures 3&4) while it always results in positive effects in high value markets (figure
5&6).
In a next step, we analyzed the innovation success of
the different market sectors in more detail, i.e. the relative
innovation success between small, medium-size and large
companies. For that purpose, the total number of innovations (including simultaneously found innovations) was
counted and divided by the market share of the regarding
company sector (i.e. small, medium or large companies).
This success index was normalized to a value between 0
and 1.

Figure 7: Innovation success by company’s size for
vt=100 (different levels of ε)

T

∑ ∑x

it
t =1 i∈NWsector

share(s ector)

T

 ∑ ∑ xit

 t =1 i∈NWsector
∑

share(s ector)
sector∈{small,medium,large}




∀ s ector ∈ {small, medium, large}

successindex(s ector) =

(4)

As can be seen in figure 7, only in the vt=100 environment the relative success of the respective sector
changes with the patent length and scope. Without patent
protection (the outer left dataset in each chart) in most
cases the small companies are the most successful actors
followed by the medium companies. In the case of a
rather low patent scope (ε=0.99) and patent length of 6 to
10 periods the large companies reached relatively more
innovations. At low ε the relations evolve inversely. Of
course these results depend on the chosen cost structures,
but it could be shown that in particular constellations and
especially with constant cost structures the variation of
patent system properties influences the success in a different way. This phenomenon has to be taken into account when designing welfare efficient patenting systems.
Figure 8: Innovation success by company’s size for
vt=1500 (different levels of ε)

5. Conclusion and Further Research
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The goal of this paper was an analysis of the impact of
software patents on the innovation activities of the software market. In this context, software development was
characterized by its sequentiality, complementarity, utilization and availability of open code as well as the necessity to ensure interoperability. We developed a bipartite
model for comparing environments with and without a
legal patent system. Based on the characteristics (e.g. sequentiality and complementarity) we identified the development costs and the existence of previous innovations as
the two key factors for innovation success. In the patent
scenario the patent itself will have an additional effect.
Computer-based simulations revealed that patent protection within low-potential markets outperforms the scenario without patenting system while the opposite holds
for high-value markets. For both systems there is a propensity to monopolize, which is more distinctive in the
low value market. The quantitative results of course are
only interpretable within the chosen environment (parameterization, modeling of decision functions etc.). Nevertheless from the model the following general findings can
be derived:
Patents lead to more or less intertemporal monopolies.
Both the patent width and the patent length as key determinants of a legal patent system from a macroeconomic
view can not be determined independent of the particular
market properties (innovation difficulty, cost and market
structure, market potential).
In some parameter constellations (lower market potential) a patent system leads to structurally different outcomes for the different market sectors.
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